Sportswashing Buys Leverage, Not Reputation: State Capital in Sport, Dependency and the Political Cost of Enforcement

Most people use the word sportswashing to mean a public relations exercise. A state with a poor human rights record buys a football club, wins trophies, and hopes people abroad start thinking about the football instead of the politics. I think that account misses the more useful thing state money buys in sport. It buys leverage.

By leverage I mean something simple. When a council, a league or a regulator comes to depend on a state’s money, acting against that state gets expensive. Nobody has to make a threat. The dependence does the work. Three clubs show how this happens in practice: Manchester City, Newcastle United and Paris Saint-Germain.

The idea is an old one. Albert Hirschman showed in 1945 that trade can be a source of national power because it creates dependence: a partner that gains more from a relationship than it could easily replace will think twice before putting it at risk.¹ Football has its own version. There are a few leagues, two governing bodies that matter, a handful of broadcasters, and city councils that own stadiums and land. Put money into those points and you become very hard to ignore.

Manchester City: the council became a business partner

Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG) bought Manchester City in 2008, and its interest in Manchester did not stop at the stadium. In 2014 the city council announced what it called a “£1bn deal” with ADUG to develop land between the Etihad Stadium and the city centre, through a joint venture called Manchester Life.² The council that owns the Etihad has been in business with the club’s owner ever since. A 2015 agreement, reported years later, gave ADUG first refusal over council land across several districts of east Manchester until the end of 2025.³

Researchers at the University of Sheffield argued in 2022 that the council had let its land go too cheaply. The council rejects that, and says the partnership has paid off.^4,5 Whether the price was fair is a separate question. Once the council became a co-venturer tied to one partner across a large part of the city, any fall-out with the club’s owners would cost the council itself.

Then the regulator acted. The Premier League opened its investigation in December 2018, after Der Spiegel published leaked emails from inside the club.⁶ The emails came from Football Leaks, an archive taken by the Portuguese hacker Rui Pinto, who was later convicted in Portugal of offences including attempted extortion.⁷ On 29 September 2026, nearly eight years after the investigation began, the League’s independent Commission found that £830.69 million of the club’s £949.94 million in Abu Dhabi sponsorship income had really been funded by its owner.⁸ City denies wrongdoing and has appealed.⁹

So leverage did not stop the case, and that matters. A well-funded regulator applying its own rules still reached findings against a state-backed club. Leverage can still buy time. UEFA’s earlier case against City had already collapsed at the Court of Arbitration for Sport in 2020, partly because it was brought too late.¹⁰ Much of the Premier League’s delay came from the club’s lawful use of litigation, and I don’t put it down to politics. But eight years is a long time for any case to run.

A few days after the findings, Emirati officials were reported to have said the decision would affect “the bilateral state relationship”.¹¹ That is second-hand reporting of unnamed sources, and it should be weighed that way. Still, it is the clearest example in this story of a regulatory decision being linked, by people speaking for the investing state, to the wider economic relationship.

One point is often overstated. The club’s chairman is listed as a diplomat at the UAE embassy in London, which gives him personal immunity.¹² That protects him as an individual. It gives nothing to the club or its owner in a league disciplinary case, and it did not stop this one.¹³

Newcastle United: a refusal became a promise

In 2020 a consortium led by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) agreed to buy Newcastle United. The Premier League’s problem was control. On legal advice, it took the view that PIF ownership meant the Saudi state itself would control the club, so the state would have to pass the League’s owners’ test.¹⁴ That looked unlikely. A World Trade Organization panel had just found Saudi Arabia responsible for failing to act against beoutQ, a pirate service showing Premier League matches whose rights in the region belonged to Qatar’s beIN.¹⁵ The consortium withdrew.

Reporting based largely on freedom of information requests later showed the Saudi side linking the League’s decision to the two countries’ “economic and commercial relations”, and British officials working to clear the obstacles.^16,17 League officials have given different accounts of whether any of this amounted to pressure.¹⁸

In October 2021 things moved quickly. On 6 October Saudi Arabia lifted its ban on beIN and promised to close pirate websites.¹⁹ On 7 October the League said it had received “legally binding assurances that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will not control Newcastle United Football Club”, and the takeover went through.²⁰

In early 2023, in a US court case over LIV Golf, the PIF described itself as “a sovereign instrumentality of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”, and its governor, who is also Newcastle’s chairman, as “a sitting minister of the Saudi government”.²¹ The assurances and that filing don’t formally contradict each other. They do sit uneasily together, and the League has never published the assurances.

Nothing here proves the League acted under pressure. The sequence shows the cost of saying no going up until the problem became a promise the League could accept.

Paris Saint-Germain: one person, three chairs

Qatar Sports Investments bought Paris Saint-Germain in 2011, and its chairman, Nasser Al-Khelaïfi, became the club’s president. He also chairs beIN Media Group. Since 2021 he has chaired the European clubs’ association, now called European Football Clubs, and he represents it on UEFA’s Executive Committee.^22,23 In 2025 beIN extended its exclusive rights to UEFA’s club competitions across the Middle East and North Africa. It bought them from UC3, the joint venture UEFA runs with that same clubs’ association.²⁴

So one person runs a club that UEFA regulates, a broadcaster that buys UEFA’s rights and the association that co-owns the company selling them, and he sits on the committee that governs the competition. I make no allegation of wrongdoing, and Swiss courts have three times acquitted him in an unrelated FIFA media-rights case.²⁵ The problem is structural. The regulated club, the regulator and the regulator’s customer meet in one office.

UEFA has acted against PSG. In 2014 the club accepted a settlement over its finances, with a financial penalty and squad limits but no ban.²⁶ In 2022 it agreed a €65 million settlement for breaking UEFA’s break-even rule, of which only €10 million was unconditional.²⁷ Enforcement happened. Against a state-owned club of PSG’s size, though, it has twice ended in a negotiated deal with most of the penalty suspended.

In my LLM thesis on tax in European football, I noted that “in the cases of both Manchester City and PSG, the relevant sponsors had direct ties to the owners of the clubs”.²⁸ Tax breaks attract players openly, through laws a parliament passes. State ownership works privately, through councils, leagues and federations, and it can buy a stake in the very bodies that are supposed to police it.

What the three clubs show

Taken together, the three cases point the same way. Leverage is strongest where the dependence is written down: in a joint venture, a sale of rights or a seat on a committee. It is weakest where you have to guess at someone’s motive. It also has limits. Manchester City still faced findings, and UEFA still penalised PSG. Money that ties up a council or a league does much less against a regulator that has no stake in the investment and its own legal powers.

Leverage rarely stops enforcement outright. It makes enforcement slower and more expensive, makes a settlement more likely, and spreads the decision across bodies that each carry only part of the cost.

What should change

If leverage works by making dependence expensive to ignore, the answer is to bring it into the open. Public bodies that do deals with a club’s owner should publish them, and senior officials should disclose their meetings with that owner while a case is live. People who sit on governing bodies should step aside from decisions about clubs or broadcasters they are tied to. Ownership tests should look at who really controls a club and stop resting on private assurances nobody can check. Cases should run to enforceable timetables, with limitation periods that start when the problem is discovered. And football’s regulators should protect whistleblowers, so the next Football Leaks does not depend on a crime.²⁹

None of this means state investment in sport should be banned. Much of it is welcome, and a city that needs housing should not have to turn capital away. Buying a club is one thing. Buying a regulator’s patience is another, and the way to stop it is to price the dependence back into the open.

A note on sources

This is a shortened version of a longer research paper, with facts stated as at 5 October 2026. I keep allegations, journalism, court findings and regulatory findings apart. No finding of wrongdoing has been made against any official referred to here, and the Commission’s findings against Manchester City are under appeal. Sentences without a footnote are my own analysis.

For the legal work behind sport, from sponsorship and endorsement agreements to image rights, see Sports Representation practice; for venue licensing and hospitality deals, see the Commercial practice.

Notes

1. Hirschman, Albert O., National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, University of California Press, 1945, doi:10.1525/9780520378179. Cited for its general argument; no pinpoint is relied on. ↩
2. Halliday, Josh, “How success of Manchester City helped put Andy Burnham in power,” The Guardian, 1 Oct. 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/oct/01/success-manchester-city-helped-put-andy-burnham-in-power. Hereafter Halliday, The Guardian, 1 Oct. 2026. ↩
3. Dulhanty, Jack, “Revealed: How Sheikh Mansour got first dibs on development in east Manchester,” The Mill, 4 July 2025, https://manchestermill.co.uk/exclusive-sheikh-mansour-contract-manchester/. The newsletter headline was “Exclusive: The contract that gives Sheikh Mansour first dibs on Manchester”. Part of the article is paywalled and was not read. ↩
4. Goulding, Richard, Adam Leaver, and Jonathan Silver, Manchester Offshored: A Public Interest Report on the Manchester Life Partnership between Manchester City Council and the Abu Dhabi United Group, Centripetal Cities, University of Sheffield, 20 July 2022, pp. 7, 25, https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/189304/1/Centripetal%20Cities%20Report%20FINAL%2020%20July%202022.pdf. Hereafter Goulding, Leaver and Silver. ↩
5. Halliday, The Guardian, 1 Oct. 2026; Waddington, Marc, Kevin Fitzpatrick, and Georgie Docker, “Ex-Manchester leader defends deals with Man City owners,” BBC News, 5 Oct. 2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c9gkv7pdd620o. Hereafter Waddington et al., BBC News, 5 Oct. 2026. ↩
6. European Investigative Collaborations, “Football Leaks Continues”, eic.network; publication of the Manchester City material began in November 2018. ↩
7. Associated Press, “Court convicts Portuguese hacker in Football Leaks trial and gives him a 4-year suspended sentence”, SecurityWeek, Sept. 2023. ↩
8. The Football Association Premier League Limited v Manchester City Football Club Limited, Independent Commission constituted under Section W of the Premier League Rules, Redacted Core Decision (published 29 Sept. 2026), paras 72, 76–77, https://resources.premierleague.pulselive.com/premierleague/document/2026/09/29/9bb3f063-6312-4d15-a1f1-77280d356a49/Premier-League-Manchester-City-independent-Commission-Redacted-Core-Decision.pdf. Hereafter Core Decision. ↩
9. 2026; Manchester City FC, statement announcing the lodging of its appeal, mancity.com, 2 Oct. 2026, https://www.mancity.com/news/club/manchester-city-lodge-appeal-63926534. ↩
10. Manchester City FC v Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), CAS 2020/A/6785, Arbitral Award (13 July 2020), Jus Mundi, https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-manchester-city-football-club-limited-v-union-des-associations-europeennes-de-football-uefa-arbitral-award-monday-13th-july-2020-1; Court of Arbitration for Sport, “Media Release: CAS 2020/A/6785 Manchester City FC v. UEFA,” 13 July 2020, https://www.tas-cas.org/generated/assets/lists/dceab111-07bc-435f-b5f9-de88eff9db72/CAS_Media_Release_6785_Decision.pdf. ↩
11. Lavelle, Daniel, “UAE may halt UK investments after Manchester City guilty verdict,” The Guardian, 3 Oct. 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2026/oct/03/united-arab-emirates-uae-uk-investments-manchester-city-guilty-verdict. Hereafter Lavelle, The Guardian, 3 Oct. 2026. The Bloomberg report was not read directly, and the officials were not named. ↩
12. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, London Diplomatic List, Oct. 2026, entry for the United Arab Emirates, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6abe2dc026660e5f62a7f1f3/LONDON_DIPLOMATIC_LIST_-_OCTOBER_2026.odt. Reporting that he has held the post since 2020 rests on the Financial Times and is not relied on here. ↩
13. Reyes v Al-Malki and another [2017] UKSC 61, paras 19, 21, https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2016_0023_judgment_2c0c2b6cc0.pdf. ↩
14. Conn, David, “Revealed: government did encourage Premier League to approve Newcastle takeover,” The Guardian, 24 May 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/may/24/government-did-encourage-premier-league-to-approve-saudi-newcastle-takeover. Hereafter Conn, The Guardian, 24 May 2022. ↩
15. Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS567/R, Panel Report circulated 16 June 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/567r_e.pdf; “Newcastle takeover in serious doubt as WTO rules pirate TV channel is Saudi,” The Guardian, 26 May 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2020/may/26/newcastle-takeover-in-serious-doubt-as-wto-rules-pirate-tv-channel-is-saudi. ↩
16. FairSquare, Easy Cities to Buy, June 2023, https://fairsq.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/FSQ_EASY-CITIES-TO-BUY_DIGITAL.pdf, pp. 8–9, 36–39, relaying reporting by Simon Walters in the Daily Mail. The Daily Mail article and the message itself were not read for this paper; the wording is FairSquare’s quotation of that report. ↩
17. FairSquare, Easy Cities to Buy, June 2023, https://fairsq.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/FSQ_EASY-CITIES-TO-BUY_DIGITAL.pdf, pp. 36–39, quoting FOI material reported by Adam Crafton in The Athletic in April 2023. The FOI documents were not read directly. ↩
18. Conn, The Guardian, 24 May 2022. ↩
19. Ingle, Sean, and Louise Taylor, “Saudi-backed takeover of Newcastle imminent after 18-month wrangle,” The Guardian, 6 Oct. 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2021/oct/06/newcastle-takeover-gets-boost-as-saudi-arabia-lifts-ban-on-bein-sports. ↩
20. Premier League, “Premier League statement on the takeover of Newcastle United,” 7 Oct. 2021, https://www.premierleague.com/en/news/2283712. ↩
21. As reported in “Court document describes Newcastle chairman as ‘sitting Saudi minister’,” The Guardian, 1 Mar. 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2023/mar/01/newcastle-united-chairman-court-document-sitting-saudi-arabia-government-minister. The filing itself was not retrieved; FairSquare, Easy Cities to Buy, p. 37, gives the same description. ↩
22. European Football Clubs, “Nasser Al-Khelaïfi – Executive Committee,” https://www.efcfootball.com/en/structure/executive-committee/nasser-al-khelaifi, accessed 5 Oct. 2026; Paris Saint-Germain, “ECA appoints Paris Saint-Germain’s Nasser Al-Khelaïfi as Chairman,” 21 Apr. 2021, https://en.psg.fr/teams/first-team/content/eca-appoints-paris-saint-germain-s-nasser-al-khelaifi-as-chairman; Dunbar, Graham, “PSG president Al-Khelaifi becomes leader of European clubs,” Associated Press, 21 Apr. 2021, https://apnews.com/article/soccer-sports-entertainment-serie-a-ligue-1-298fc2d872ac20031ae6eb2708858f82. ↩
23. Warshaw, Andrew, “UEFA Congress: Al-Khelaifi and Clarke take seats at Europe’s top table,” Inside World Football, 7 Feb. 2019, https://insideworldfootball.com/?p=110830. ↩
24. beIN Media Group, “beIN MEDIA GROUP Extends Rights Deal in MENA and Asia to Broadcast UEFA Club Competitions Until 2027,” 28 Apr. 2025, https://www.beinmediagroup.com/article/bein-media-group-extends-rights-deal-in-mena-and-asia-to-broadcast-uefa-club-competitions-until-2027/. ↩
25. Dunbar, Graham, “PSG’s Al-Khelaïfi acquitted in World Cup rights case with ex-FIFA official Valcke,” Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/fifa-investigation-appeals-alkhelaifi-valcke-e970e61d8cc1c08cf36de9c6b15f3fae. The AP report describes the supreme court ruling as his “third acquittal in five years”; the article is dated 19 Dec. 2025. ↩
26. UEFA, “Decision of the Chief Investigator of the CFCB Investigatory Chamber: Settlement Agreement with Paris Saint-Germain Football Club” (published summary), Nyon, May 2014, https://editorial.uefa.com/resources/0258-0e2dedb6bf65-df535c83724f-1000/paris_saint-germain_-_settlement_agreement_-_may_2014.pdf. ↩
27. UEFA, “The CFCB First Chamber finalises the monitoring of clubs having taken part in 2021/22 UEFA club competitions,” 2 Sept. 2022, https://www.uefa.com/news-media/news/0279-1603e68faca4-8a20edf89532-1000–the-cfcb-first-chamber-finalises-the-monitoring-of-clubs-h/. ↩
28. Eshqoor, Karim, “Tax Optimization in European Football: Attracting Top Talent,” ResearchGate, 2019, republished Barbarian Law, 4 Mar. 2023, “Overvaluation of Sponsorship”, https://barbarianlaw.ca/tax-optimization-in-european-football-attracting-top-talent/. Hereafter Eshqoor, “Tax Optimization”. The republication is unpaginated; pinpoints are to its section headings. ↩
29. Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, art. 2(1)(a)(ii) and Annex. ↩

State Capital and Leverage in Sport: Key Questions

The paper’s main ideas, case studies, and proposed reforms.

What does “buying leverage” mean in sport?

When a council, a league or a regulator comes to depend on a state’s money, acting against that state gets expensive. Nobody has to make a threat. The dependence does the work. That is a different idea from sportswashing as a public relations exercise aimed at fans abroad.

How did leverage show up at Manchester City?

Manchester City Council has been in a property joint venture with the club’s owner since 2014, so a fall-out with the owner would cost the council directly. The Premier League still reached findings against the club in 2026, after an investigation that took nearly eight years. City denies wrongdoing and has appealed.

What happened with the Newcastle United takeover?

In 2020 the Premier League treated the Saudi state as the club’s would-be controller, and the deal stalled. In October 2021, the day after Saudi Arabia settled its piracy dispute with Qatar’s beIN, the League approved the takeover on “legally binding assurances” that the Saudi state would not control the club.

Why does Paris Saint-Germain matter to the argument?

PSG’s president also chairs beIN, which buys UEFA’s rights, and leads the clubs’ association that co-owns the company selling them, while sitting on UEFA’s Executive Committee. No wrongdoing is alleged, and the conflict is structural. UEFA’s two financial cases against PSG ended in settlements with most of the penalty suspended.

What should football regulators change?

Publish deals between public bodies and club owners, require conflicted officials to step aside, test who really controls a club, run cases to enforceable timetables, and protect whistleblowers.

This paper is published for scholarly and general information purposes and is not legal advice. Barbarian Law® is a registered trademark (CIPO Reg. No. TMA 1,359,734).